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Introduction 
 
Trust is most present when it goes unnoticed.1 He who is wary that relevant others take his 
own interest into account when they (inter)act is distrustful, a situation that calls for trust 
restoring actions. In a fundamental sense, trust is the absence of distrust. He who trusts counts 
on others taking his interest into account, something that is built into the relationship. The 
same applies to ‘bona fides’ in agreements. When we contract we understand the other party 
to be interested in having the terms of the contract materialize, without subterfuge or cheating. 
To contract involves in one sense or another a joint belief in a positive outcome. But in our 
analytical, self-interested world we tend to dissect this trust into a) a perception on the part of 
the trustor, and b) a motivation on the part of the trustee. ‘Pacta sunt servanda’ is one way to 
express this relationship. The trustor can trust, because the norm for the trustee is to perform 
his contracts. We look for guarantees and the guarantee of trust is here a strong theory of 
obligation, be it in terms of a moral or a political theory. Who doesn’t perform his contracts 
goes to hell, c.q. to prison. That will make them behave!  
                                                 
1 Among the thriving literature on trust I am most inspired by the work of Olli Lagerspetz. 
See his Trust, Ethics and Human Reason (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015),  and Olli 
Lagerspetz and Lars Hertzberg, ‘Trust in Wittegenstein’, in: Pekka Mäkelä and Cynthia 
Townley (eds), Trust: Analytic and Applied Perspectives (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013) pp. 31-
51. “Thus by invoking the language of trust and betrayal, we do not simply identify facts, 
possibilities, or risks that exist out there. Instead we take up a certain perspective. In the 
sequel, it will be argued that this perspective is an ethical one.  ... My faith that you will not 
betray me goes beyond expecting you to do, or refrain from doing, certain specific things; it 
involves resting assured that you will be mindful of my well-being. Trust, in this sense, is an 
open-ended relation between two individuals.” (p. 39-42). 
This is not Grotius’s view. It is not that Grotius does not believe in punishment.2 Yet, he 
does not believe that trust can be built by threat or fear. This is a consequence of his wish to 
overcome the scepticism inherent in the reason of state politics of his days that had produced 
the terror of the Spanish inquisition [p. 77] and related warfare in the Low Countries.3 To talk 
about trust is to confront cases of perfidy.  In this chapter I will therefore first discuss Grotius 
on ‘fides et perfidia’, then on scepticism and justice, in order to show – via a digression on 
consensus and concordia – the structural role of trust in his understanding of what makes out 
successful co-operation among men.  
 
Grotius’s youthful research project 
 
In his youth, Grotius was very much engaged with the issue of trust. Yet, if one puts next to 
each other the various statements on trust in his writings from the first decade of the 
seventeenth century – a period that grosso modo coincided with the first ten years of his 
literary creation – it may seem not easy to decipher the argumentative structure underlying 
them. In its most elaborate version – in the chapter ‘de fide et perfidia’ of his 1602-manuscript 
Parallelon rerum publicarum – trust is presented in a multi-faceted way, bringing together 
different sorts of arguments for different manifestations of trust.4  
At the end of the chapter “De fide et perfidia” of his Parallelon Grotius wrote in praise 
of the commercial nation that the Dutch republic was: 
 
                                                 
2 Grotius actually had a very sophisticated theory of punishment, see Andrew Blom, ‘Owing 
Punishment: Grotius on Right and Merit’, Grotiana, 36 (2015), pp. 3-27. 
3 On the historical circumstances, see e.g. James Tracy, The Founding of the Dutch Republic. 
War, Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572-1588 (Oxford UP, 2008, and Henk Nellen, Hugo 
Grotius, A lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State 1583-1645 (Leiden: Brill, 2015). 
4 The chapter ‘De fide et perfidia’ has been published from the Ms, with introduction and 
translation by Arthur Eyffinger in Grotiana 36 (2005), 79-171; J. Meerman published his 
transcription from the Ms, with Dutch translation and annotations in 1801-03 in 4 volumes: 
Hugonis Grotii, Batavi, Parallelon rerumpublicarum liber tertius: De moribus ingenioque 
populorum Atheniensium, Romanorum, Batavorum, 4 vols, ed. by J. Meerman (Haarlem: 
Loosjes, 1801-1803). 
Everywhere else, the public interest is undermined by the quest for private profit, 
whereas with us harmony [concordia] prevails through never ending loyalty [perpetua 
fide]. No way, for sure, will any other nation be able to snatch from us these 
achievements of the first order, which have only become possible by the joint efforts 
of all. Other nations may perhaps prove themselves a match to us in commercial 
shrewdness; but they will never equal us in justice, that unique linchpin of society. 5 
 
[p. 78] “Perpetua fide” is maybe a bit of a hyperbole, but in this passage we find it all 
together: commercial acumen, public interest and concordia, thanks to an outstanding justitia 
that ties together the society. 
We might more fully understand this from the youthful research program that Grotius 
set out for himself. When the young Grotius was charting out his publishing ambitions, he had 
a clear view of the broad range that he wanted to cover, and by and large his announcements 
were not just the stuff ambition is made of, but did indeed point forward to later publications. 
In the letter to the reader in Sacra in quibus Adamus exul we find a list of intended 
publications with items such as a poem on the Institutes of Justinian.6 Of these writings on 
law, only the paraphrase of the Institutes was published in part, in a volume of poetry that his 
brother Willem edited.7 The annotations on Papianus can be traced in the marginalia in a copy 
                                                 
5 alibi commune corrumpi privatis commodis; hic perpetua fide contineri concordiam. Quare 
certissimum est, res maximas & quae non nisi junctis opibus geri possunt, haudquaquam 
nobis praeripi posse ab aliis gentibus, quae, ut pares sint mercaturae solertia, vincuntur certe 
justitia, quod unicum societatis est vinculum. (Parallelon, caput VI.77 (p. 170-1)). 
6 ‘Commentarius in sex leges difficillimas, quas damnatas vocant, iam ante biennium 
absolutus. Pandectarum eclogae indigestae sunt et tertia parte imperfectae. Institutionum 
Iustinianearum ἔμμετρος μετάφρασις dimidio sui ante annos aliquot expedita est. His 
accedant in Papianum posterioris aevi iurisconsultum, et ea quae apud Isidorum de iure 
traduntur, notae. Ad civilem scientiam spectant nostratis reipublicae cum aliis olim nobilibus 
successuumque inter se comparatio; et alia, ut spero, ad historiam eorum quae in mea patria 
meo aevo aut circiter illud accidere.’, Briefwisseling vol.  17, Letter 22A (summer 1601), p. 
19; Cf. A. Eyffinger, Introduction, in: De dichtwerken van Hugo Grotius, II, 5A-B, ed. by B. 
L. Meulenbroek (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1978), pp. 23-36. 
7 Poemata collecta et magnam partem nunc primum edita à fratre (Leiden, 1617). The 
annotations on Papianus can be traced in the marginalia in a copy of the Codex Theodosianus 
of the Codex Theodosianus;8 the contributions to the ‘scientia civilis’ finally are the 
Parallelon rerumpublicarum, and the Annales et historiae. 
This scholarly programme of the young Grotius belies the received opinion that he got 
involved in legal discourse only on the occasion of the prize taking in February 1603 of the 
Portuguese carrack Santa Catarina and its justification in De iure praedae of 1604-5. Then 
Grotius started reading, it is said, the authors of the second scholastics in order to collect the 
arguments for his first juridical treatise. But in another early work – the Parallelon 
rerumpublicarum –, which Grotius finished working on in 1602 – we find three 
announcements of future [p. 79] publications – on the nature and right of war, on the Dutch 
revolt, and on state and religion according to the ius divine and the ius gentium.9  
 
I destined a separate book to inspect the causes and the right of war. We have as we do 
always in all our actions, undertaken the present war with the fullest right, as if 
something that is to be done out of necessity could ever be unjust. But also for this a 
separate book will serve.10 
  
On the war with Spain:  
 
This will be more seemly done in a book that expressly is destined for this purpose. 11 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
– see P.J. Verdam, Een commentaar van Hugo de Groot op de Lex Romana Burgundionum, 
Amsterdam 1963 –; the contribution to the scientia civilis finally are the Parallelon 
rerumpublicarum, and the Annales et historiae. 
8  See P.J. Verdam, Een commentaar van Hugo de Groot op de Lex Romana Burgundionum, 
Amsterdam 1963. 
9 For ‘De fide et perfidia’ I refer to page and paragraph numbers in the Eyffinger edition in 
Grotiana, for the rest of  Parallelon, I give references to the foliation of the Ms. and to the 
pages of its edition by  Johan Meerman. The translations of the latter quotations are mine. 
10 ‘Librum enim destinavimus caussarum et iuris [belli] examini. Nos ut alia semper, ita hoc 
bellum summo iure suscepimus, nisi iniuste id fieri potest quod sit necessario; sed hoc etiam 
singulari libro servabitur.’ (Fol. 101r; I, p. 113). 
11 ‘Id autem commodius fiet libro quem huic rei singillatim destinavimus.’ (fol. 173r; II, p. 
75). 
On church politics, and toleration in religion: 
 
But what in this matter is regarded as forbidden or permitted by divine law and the law 
of nations, shall be the topic of another treatise. Also the political events that pertain 
thereto will be more seemly integrated into this other exposition. 12  
 
This time the announcements are of what apparently are meant to be book-length 
monographs, not poetical paraphrases. Grotius must have hit upon a new perspective in these 
years, and is considering the lacunae in his present study. All three works are on legal matters, 
reinforcing the impression from the Adamus exul that (natural) law is certainly on his mind in 
these years.  The Parallelon itself is written in a combination of the style of Tacitus, the 
[p. 80] philosophy of Cicero and the theology of Junius,13 and it provides a comparison ‘de 
moribus ingenioque’ of the Athenian, Roman and Batavian republics. Historically well 
informed, with strong statements about the recent years of Spanish fury, the text analyzes the 
customs and institutions of these three states on a series of topics, following a partly 
Aristotelian, partly Ciceronian classification of the virtues. It is worthwhile to look at the civil 
philosophy of this early work. What was Grotius’s project in these early years, and how are 
his ideas about the fitness of man for social life developing?   
 
Against perfidy, and the reification of distrust 
 
His Tacitean language shows in many a memorable phrase, as when he summarises his story 
of the workings of the Spanish inquisition in the Low Countries – with its confiscation of 
                                                 
12  ‘Sed quid in hac caussa iure divino et gentium praecipi videatur atque permitti, alia erit 
dissertatio. Res etiam gestas, quae huc pertinent, caeterae narrationi commodius erit attexere.’ 
(Fol. 301v-302r; III, p. 97). See A. Eyffinger, ‘Hugo Grotius’ Parallelon rerumpublicarum’, 
in: De Hollandse jaren van Hugo de Groot 1583-1621 Ed. by H.J.M. Nellen and J. Trapman 
(Hilversum: Verloren, 1996), pp. 87-95. 
13 On his teacher Franciscus Junius (1545-1602), Grotius wrote in an epitaph (in Grotius, 
Poemata, collecta, p. 257): ‘Ille triumphato toties errore, quadrigis / invectus docuit 
relligionis iter. /... /Orba parente domus, pubes studiosa magistro / Quod dolet & lachrymat, 
ne putet esse suum, / Privati non sunt in tanto funere questus.’ 
property –, by remarking that the greatest heresy apparently was being wealthy,14 or 
criticising the Anabaptists who refuse to carry arms or perform political functions, unless the 
opportunity of an adventure came up.15 Such inconstant and inconsequent behaviour, Grotius 
characterises as perfidy, no other sect is more perfidious than this one.16 In other words, the 
inquisition acts on false pretences, and the Anabaptists are a licentious bunch, breaking 
concord and not willing to act by civil and Christian principles. Notwithstanding these and 
similar Tacitean fireworks, the argument of the book might appear a bit tame. Holland is 
praised on the major aspects of it’s by now well-known self-image: freedom-loving, 
enterprising and entrepreneurial, modest, courageous, trustworthy, just and industrious. But 
this tameness is in appearance only. 
The comparative set-up of the book allows Grotius to develop a political theory by 
implication: by expanding on the shortcomings of Athenian perfidy and Roman corruption, 
Grotius can indicate what Holland is not, without thereby necessarily having to develop a full-
fledged positive political theory. This tendency is reinforced by the historical take on customs 
and institutions. In what might look like a tautology, Grotius claims that the basic 
characteristics of a [p. 81] country exist because they can show a long history.17 The love of 
freedom of the Germanic people, the governance contracts with the rulers, the commercial 
orientation close to erasing the public-private distinction with the inclusion of the merchants’ 
wives in running the shop,18 living according to one’s means, modest desires, readiness for 
public service as a magistrate, capacity to co-operate in complex economic activities (Indian 
                                                 
14 Erit maxima omnium Haeresis, esse locupletem (Fol. 299r; III, p. 94). 
15 [N]isi cum audendi occasio est. (Fol. 296r; III, p. 91). 
16 Non alterius cuiusque sectae magis metuenda perfidia est. (Ibid.) 
17 Cf. Hugo Grotius, Liber de antiquitate reipublicae Batavicae (Leiden, 1610), Proemium 
[4v]: ‘Certissimum enim argumentum imperii bene constituti est diuturnitas: hinc maior eius 
fiducia amorque civibus: nec aliam magis ob causam durat republica, quam quia duravit’;  
‘De fide et perfidia’, par. 38; my ‘The great Privilege (1477) as ‘Code of Dutch Freedom: the 
political role of privileges in the Dutch Revolt and after’, in Das Privileg im europäischen 
Vergleich, ed. by Barbara Dölemeyer and Heinz Mohnhaupt (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann, 
1997), pp. 233-247. 
18 For a practical reason: the husband is away for business for long periods, thus his wife has 
to be acquainted with the husband’s trade. 
trade, land reclaim, Spanish revolt). It might appear to be a self-congratulatory rhetorical 
exercise to help identify the identity of the new Dutch state under construction.19  
Tacitus’s Germania provides the disinterested support when e.g. he is quoted saying 
that the Batavians always elected their own captains, who were called kings, or that Tacitus 
calls the Batavian nation also a commonwealth,20 and therefore Holland was ‘sui iuris 
Respublica’, not subject to ‘externis legibus’ it was even a ‘liberissime respublica’. But for 
Grotius long-lasting is basically re-enactment of the past, and tradition is kept alive by re-
confirmation, as we see expressed in his discussion of the validity of constitutional 
arrangements in chapters 3 and 4 of book I of De iure belli ac pacis. 21 
The opposite of distrust and perfidy thus is a well-organised, free state, where justice 
reigns and concord rules. Of course, such a state is supported by ‘eternal trust’. Another 
important example of fides provides the self-sacrifice of Regulus (or Regius, as Grotius writes 
in Parallelon) in his dedication to live up to his promises and serve the public good. In the 
midst of the First Punic War, the Roman consul M. Atilius Regulus returned to Rome on 
parole from his captivity in Carthago, to plea for the release of Carthagan prisoners in Rome. 
Instead he urged the Senate not to release the prisoners, and returned [p. 82] to Cathago to be 
tortured to death. This at least is how Grotius understood the available sources:  
 
Now as regards observing of the terms of treaties, can there ever be a more shining 
example than M. Atilius Regius? Even though, all things said and done, with him it is 
not so much his good faith we admire, however famous and renowned in its own right, 
but with even more justice his firmness. Without breach of word he could have simply 
pronounced the verdict that the prisoners of war should be released. In that case his 
authority, or otherwise sheer compassion, would no doubt have prevailed. But he 
advised against it, even though he read the enemy’s cruelty well enough and had long 
divined their sophisticated torture techniques. With him, clearly, the pledge he had 
                                                 
19 Cf.  Leo Braudy, The Frenzy of Renown: Fame & Its History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
20 ‘Gentem Batavam & Civitatem vocat Tacitus’, Parallelon, Fol. 14v; I, p. 28. Cf. Tac. 
Germania, 13. 
21 Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis ... curavit B.J.A. de Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp 
(Leiden: Brill, 1939); photomechanical reprint with annotations by Robert Feenstra et al. 
(Aalen: Scientia, 1993) [hereafter IBP]. 
made in his private capacity even prevailed over the national interest, just like the 
national interest prevailed over his good faith, and either of these over the apprehension 
of being tortured.22 
 
This case of ancient honour surpasses any consideration of fame or self-interest, making 
service to the public good as well as constancy of character the dominant motive for action. It 
is the concentration in the moral psychology of one person, what the dedication to never 
ending loyalty [perpetua fide] was on the part of the Hollanders. Yet, these two exempla are 
exceptions in a sea of distrust and perfidy in the Parallelon, and its main thrust is to decry the 
shortcomings of politics, to the point of doubting the very possibility of just and fair societies 
in this world. 
 
Why the laws of nature obligate, and what therefore the laws of nature comprise 
 
If Carneades was right that we have as good arguments for as against the existence of justice, 
then Grotius’s attempt to defuse this scepticism by a method of Cartesian doubt was perhaps 
the only way for him to save justice. The price, however, was high: Grotius’s justice had to be 
a minimal one, and other moral considerations, like happiness, were necessarily left aside. 
This minimal justice was founded on trust, reflecting a Roman heritage, and contemporary 
political argument. Between 1605 and 1625, Grotius further developed his thoughts on trust, 
justice and morality, and created the first modern theory of sociability. [p. 83] And in the end, 
maybe the greatest happiness is achieved by not explicitly aiming at it, in that happiness 
figures as an unintended consequence of justice being achieved.  
Scepticism was a major challenge in Grotius’s early years.23 But it was always 
combined with a belief in the possibility of morality, an attitude that might be best described 
                                                 
22 ‘De fide et perfidia’, par. 15. 
23 The classical argument for Grotius’s concern for Carneades is in Richard Tuck’s 
publications, especially Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), see also his ‘Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes’, Grotiana 4 (1983), pp. 
43-62. I distinguish between Grotius’s engagement with the skeptical challenge and Tuck’s 
claim that Grotius answered the challenge with an Epicurean social theory. My reading of 
Grotius emphasizes on the one hand his eclecticism (i.e. his proposal of a ‘Rawlsian’ 
as sceptical humanism, in Grotius’s case a combination of Tacitus and Cicero, as exemplified 
in the Tacitism in his Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis, and in the Ciceronean 
Parallelon rerumpublicarum.24 Grotius was not a sceptic like Montaigne, nor a philosopher 
like Descartes. Yet he addressed the sceptical issue that marred political thought in his days in 
a strong and effective way. Not unlike Edward Herbert he questioned the problem of religious 
truth, not unlike Lipsius he saw the complicated relationship between political prudence and 
political wisdom. Therefore, Grotius was interested in establishing his ethos as a political 
writer by addressing scepticism head-on, by referring to Carneades – and thereby to the 
classical case of Cicero’s discussion of him –, who had argued one day in defence of justice 
and the next day denying its possibility.  Doubting the very grounds of justice is – Grotius 
rightly perceived – equivalent to undermining its role in politics and opening the way for 
Machiavellian power politics, as Grotius perceived it in Spanish and later French international 
politics, where all is allowed in name of some allegedly superior principle.25 Grotius himself 
agreed to the principle that if God has set us a goal, he also provides the instruments to 
achieve that goal (a theological version of the principle that ‘ought implies can’),26 as well as 
the notion of ‘nihil [p. 84] frustra’: the idea that the elements of creation are all to a purpose.27 
These are basic principles of naturalism28 – of Grotius and of many of his followers – which 
                                                                                                                                                        
overlapping consensus), but on the other the Stoic elements in his understanding of natural 
law. 
24 In 1601Grotius was appointed by the States of Holland to write a history of the Dutch 
Revolt, of which the Parallelon was a first specimen. As the official historian of the States, 
since1604, the Annales et historiae were written. 
25 See on such justification of Machiavellian politics by allegedly anti-Machiavellians: Robert 
Bireley, The Counter Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in 
Early Modern Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). 
26 De iure praedae commentarius. Ex auctoris codice descripsit et vulgavit H.G. Hamaker 
(Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1868) [hereafter IPC] II (p. 11). 
27 IPC III (p. 35): ‘Deus, qui nihil frustra, nihil perperam faciat’, God, who does nothing 
without purpose or erroneously. 
28 Even though the nihil frustra and the means and ends arguments stem ultimately from 
Aristotle’s Politika, I prefer to call them naturalist, as the seventeenth century will generally 
do. That is notwithstanding the important role that reinterpretations of Aristotle played in the 
coming about of this naturalism. See my Causality and morality in politics (Utrecht, 1995). 
might of course also be used to justify a Machiavellian instrumentalism. To counter such 
misuse, Grotius set out to purify the discussion about the goals, on the basis of the 
functionalist teleology inherent in his naturalism. It is a move that has elements in common 
with philosophical transcedentalism:29 i.e. to formulate the necessary preconditions for social 
life itself. Some moral principles must be true, even on account of a sceptic, because without 
them social life could not take place to start with. In Cartesian analogy: ‘I live in society, 
therefore I am moral (in some sense)’. No reference to ultimate goals, no greatest happiness 
for the greatest number, no eudaimonia, no city of God, only a peaceful and ordered life with 
others. Of course, there are again many different answers to the quest for a peaceful social 
life, from religious – sectarian – convictions to diverse grand philosophical schemas. Grotius 
puts these alternatives effectively aside by searching for what John Rawls will call the 
overlapping consensus.30 There are two formulations on this aspect that merit our attention. 
The first is the statement that all philosophical sects agree on one point: that man’s self-
preservation is recommended to him. Even the Academics, these masters of ignorance, agree 
here, says Grotius, thereby underlining his strategy as anti-sceptic.31 Self-interest, he seems to 
say, is nothing special, because it is also defendable within the other philosophical traditions, 
not just among the sceptics. Moreover, precisely for this reason, self-preservation is not 
automatically anti-social. So the classical Carneades argument that ‘there is no justice, or, if 
such there be, it is extreme folly’32 is really jumping to conclusions. Of course this argument 
from overlapping consensus is not the only argument for justice in Grotius, yet it 
demonstrates nicely the extent to which Grotius is not after grand foundations, but first of all 
looks for justifications in terms of consensus omnium, more specifically in a Rawlsian sense. 
[p. 85] This trumping of the sceptics’ argument is already fully developed in De iure 
praedae, written in 1604-5, where it obtained also a general justificatory theoretical envelope, 
i.e. a general Christian-Stoic ontology – according to which the world is created by God(s) 
and in this creation we can find the moral perspective we are looking for. More in particular, 
we have to search human nature as created in order to understand man’s rights and 
                                                 
29 This is why the story of Grotius in many histories ends with Kant, who put an accolade to 
the concepts of reason, and history. 
30 J. Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
31 IPC II (p. 11, 13). 
32 IBP Prol. 5. 
obligations. Self-preservation (a decent amor sui)33 and ratio & oratio 34are the two main 
characteristics of this human nature; on the one hand the almost animal spirits or instincts that 
make us distinguish good from bad for ourselves, on the other the capacity of self-
commitment and self-command – later called the capacity to live according to rules –, 
mediated by a basic fellow-feeling that tells us that reciprocity is part of our survival strategy. 
When I claim the right to fend for myself, I must allow others to do the same.  
Grotius does not deny the desirability of a fuller morality than just the minimal one of 
amor sui, reciprocity and self commitment. Basically there is no difference between amor sui 
and amor alteri; both are cases of amor, of taking something to heart. We can as well expound 
on the one as on the other. Christianity, Grotius will claim in De veritate religionis 
Christianae, and in its predecessor Bewijs van de ware godsdienst, has the fullest developed 
morality of benevolence, and its cultivation is an individual’s duty.35 That is not to say, that 
this Christian morality is an objectively existing thing. It is for that very reason that religious 
convictions are not objectively ascertainable. And the flip side of this is that both creed and 
morality in the broad sense are so effective because they are personal, the expression of the 
person’s conscience and self-imposed norms. This is the kind of person that I am, c.q. that I 
believe God wants me to be, and thus the strongest moral motivator that one can think of. And 
precisely for this reason no fixed set of moral norms on this level can be [p. 86] essential to 
social order, unless, that is, these norms are universally accepted to be so. We will see this 
moment of subjectivity as motivating factor return in the so-called regula fidei in IPC. 
  
                                                 
33 IPC II (p. 11). 
34 On reason, see IPC I (p. 7); on speech see Meletius 83 (p. 131): ‘Words too have their own 
law, which is not to deviate from the truth. This is easy to defend, for instance against Plato, 
who in some case justifies people lying. But this is an inadmissible perversion. For God has 
given speech to man in order that human society should be more closely knit by people 
sharing their very thoughts. And once the license to lie has 
been given it is bound to overstep all limits and to remove that which is the most important in 
human relationships, namely mutual trust’. On the connection with Cicero, cf. Benjamin 
Straumann,  Roman Law in the State of Nature. The Classical Foundations of Hugo Grotius’ 
Natural Law (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 95. 
35 Cf. Hugo Grotius – Theologian. Essays in Honour of G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, ed. by 
Henk Nellen and Edwin Rabbie (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
Grotius deploys a second strategy to argue for reciprocity,36 based on what exactly it is 
to fend for oneself as explained in the De iure praedae, VII, p. 67ff and in De iure belli ac 
pacis, Prolegomena 8:  
 
This maintenance of the social order, which we have roughly sketched, and which is 
consonant with human intelligence, is the source of law properly so called. To this 
sphere of law belong the abstaining from that which is another’s, the restoration to 
another of anything of his which we may have, together with any gain which we may 
have received from it; the obligation to fulfil promises, the making good of loss incurred 
through our fault, and the inflicting of penalties upon men according to their deserts.37 
 
Benjamin Straumann has put forward the interpretation that this enumeration of ius naturae, 
or justice in the strict sense, describes the legal remedies allotted by the Roman Praetor. 
Whether or not Grotius was really referring to this institution of Roman law, and/or whether 
he understood it correctly, is of lesser importance than that one might indeed understand right 
in the strict sense as legal actions, i.e. as institutionally available ways of proceeding for the 
regulation of those aspects of social interaction where individuals might experience conflicts 
with others. One might argue that there is no proof that these four legal remedies comprise the 
only institution for the purpose, but this one seems to befit human nature (instinct of self-
preservation, ratio & oratio) reasonably well, in particular as being compatible with the 
empirical observation that living together is regularly conflictual rather than harmonious. 
Moreover, it coheres with the Ulpian definition of justice: 
 
D. 1.1.10 Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique ... sunt haec: honeste 
vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.  
 
                                                 
36 IPC III (p. 3): ‘Quae tibi velis fieri, alteri feceris:  quae nolis, ne feceris.’ 
37 Haec vero quam rudi modo iam expressimus societatis custodia humano intellectui 
conveniens, fons est eius iuris, quod proprie tali nomine appellatur: quo pertinent alieni 
abstinentia, et si quid alieni habeamus aut lucri inde fecerimus restitutio, promissorum 
implendorum obligatio, damni culpa dati reparatio, et poenae inter homines meritum. 
[p. 87] With one difference, though, as Grotius himself remarked: obligation arising from 
contract or tort –had not been part of the standard definition of justice, yet it belongs there.38 
In the context of defining just war, this new understanding of justice allows him the following 
claim  
 
Indeed, in so far as we are concerned with subject-matter[i.e. the causa materialis of 
just intervention], which is the same in warfare and in judicial trials, we may say that 
there should be precisely as many kinds of execution as there are kinds of legal action. 
 
The actual existence of such an institution for the establishing of justice by legal actions is a 
very strong argument for its validity, especially since Rome is known for its exceptionally 
well-developed sense of law, as Grotius noticed in Parallelon. The logical priority of warfare 
and judicial trial might pose a problem, and to sort out that problem Grotius had developed a 
sophisticated argument from natural law as he also applied in the matter of property. 
Distinguishing between the world before and after the introduction of government, and 
arguing that some institutions can be regarded as a natural sequel to the laws of nature, 
Grotius had shown that modern property is a human perfection or adaptation of the original 
law of nature to the conditions of man in history. This applies as well to the instruments of 
justice. Before the Fall, Adam had ruled his wife, after the Fall the ‘patres familias’ had 
decided on the respective rights of the members of their household. After the Flood gradually 
government arose, based on consensus (about how to sort out conflicts) and commitment to 
one’s own decisions (fides). Indeed, the second chapter of De iure praedae reads as a 
conjectural history of state formation, once mankind decided to leave behind their ‘simple and 
innocent life, but turned their thoughts to various kinds of knowledge’,39 and left that 
‘primitive state which might have lasted if men had continued in great simplicity, or had lived 
on terms of mutual affection such as rarely appears’.40 Thus similarly as the institution of 
property adapted the natural law principle of the use of the world given to mankind in 
common to the situation of growing population, so the institution of legal actions adapted the 
natural law principle of mutual respect for life, liberty and property.  
 
                                                 
38 IPC VII (p. 67, 69). 
39 IBP II.2.2.2. 
40 IBP II.2.2.1. 
 [p. 88] How to distinguish concordia from consensus 
 
As a humanist jurist, Grotius was driven by Ciceronian concepts such as justitia, honestum 
and utile, adiafora, and the civic virtue of the aristocrats.41 Natural law, Grotius had been 
taught by Franciscus Junius, is cosmopolitan law, that is, valid for all, on grounds that are 
recognizable by all. That was why Junius would not deny that the Ten Commandments 
comprise principles of natural law, but nonetheless denied that the Ten Commandments are 
the source of natural law.42   This universal, invariable part of right can be looked upon as the 
expression of human consensus, as well as the conclusions of reason; of course willed by God 
who has created mankind in this way. A crucial concept here is consensus, much 
misunderstood by later critics like Pufendorf and Heineccius. For Grotius, however, 
consensus was an essential element of sociability. All well-ordered societates, societies – 
from a business cooperation to a full-fledged body politic, and ultimately to that great society 
of mankind – exhibit this characteristic of agreement, i.e. a modicum of coordination of 
thought and action for the furtherance of the goals of the particular society in question.  
In the chapter of Parallelon on concupiscence – ‘de venere’ –  Grotius describes 
temperantia as a form of concordia, a Pythagorean harmony.43 There are other uses of 
concordia, as in ‘publica Concordia’ that is maintained by organising dinner parties for 
neighbourhoods, guilds or learned societies.44 To the ancient Franks – who were so similar to 
the Batavians – the historian Agathias attributes ‘the greatest civility, incredible religiosity, 
                                                 
41 Cf. Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 159. 
42 See Franciscus Junius [pater], De politiae Mosis (1593). See esp. Tobias Sarx, Franciscus 
Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602). Ein reformierter Theologe im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
späthumanistischer Irenik und reformierter Konfessionalisierung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2007). 
43  ‘Postremo vero, cum temperantia non tantum in tuenda mediocritate consistat, sed in 
concordia quadam et concentu vitae, quem Pythagoraei harmoniam dicerent, videor hic non 
importuno loco inserere posse morum tenaciam constantiamque propositi.’, (Parallelon, Fol. 
117v; II, p. 18). 
44  [Parallelon, Fol. 134v; II, p. 36. 
also justice and concord among themselves’.45 In the latter case, concordia is used as what 
one might term sustainable alliance, as it is in Grotius’s description of the Compromise of 
Nobles of 1566, and its petition in defence of the old privileges. [p. 89] Thus, the start of the 
Dutch revolt is qualified by concordia.46 Furthermore we find use of concordia as 
‘agreement’47  ‘the pact of the people in the defence of freedom’;48 ‘concordiae leges’,49 de 
‘admirable agreeing of the minds’ in the war against Spain.50 Grotius also contrasts civil 
discord with a certain bond of humanity: ’for what prevents in a civil disagreement and 
opposition of parts, such that each of them sees as it were in the chances of war a 
compromise?’,51 the union of Gand is a concordia,52 and in Holland the harmony is 
maintained by way of a perpetual trust: ‘hic perpetua fide contineri concordiam’, as we had 
seen above. 53 
This idea of a basic understanding among socii is often related to the notion of 
concentric circles, to capture the Stoic origins of this cosmopolitan preconception of a natural 
law. Mankind’s humanity expresses itself in a fundamental agreement that on a daily basis is 
discovered from the agreement in the small societies of family and similar. The agreement 
becomes more abstract when the concentric circles widen, until at the end only the 
quintessence of humanity remains.54 This consensus, maybe not directly discernible in more 
inclusive societies, may seem to contain the seeds of natural law. 
It is valid without reference needed to particular persons or circumstances. Trust is a 
relationship that holds independent of the utility involved, that is, independent from the 
                                                 
45 ‘civilitatem maximam, pietatem incredibilem, iustitiam deinde et inter se concordiam 
Agathias tribuit’, Parallelon, Fol.  168v; II, p. 71-2. 
46 Parallelon, Fol. 299r-v; III, p.  94. 
47 Parallelon, Fol. 3r; I, p. 15. 
48 ‘genti pro libertate concordia’, Parallelon, Fol. 18r; I, p. 31. 
49 Parallelon, Fol. 46v; I, p. 60. 
50 ‘mira animorum concordia’, Parallelon, Fol. 57r; I, p. 70. 
51 ‘Quid igitur vetat in civili dissensione partiumque discordia, ut utrinque veluti in belli 
fortunam compromissum videatur?’, Parallelon, Fol. 60r; I, p. 74. 
52 Parallelon, Fol. 86v; I, p. 98. 
53 Parallelon, Fol. 89r; I, p. 101. 
54 Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy. Cosmopolitanism and 
Moral Theory (Cambridge UP, 2010) is a book-length discussion of the topic. 
particular persons or the circumstances, at least in the ideal case. Because if trust were to 
depend on family ties, business ties, nationality or religion, it would not be trust, but 
something else. And precisely since trust is this utility-independent relationship, it is by 
necessity an abstract thing. It is about fundamental expectations, not about what makes quid-
pro-quo such a more precise relationship. At the same time, trust is a normative concept: it is 
about what humans should do in so far as they are part of humanity. We should not lay in 
ambush for our fellowman, as Lactantius is quoted by Grotius in De iure praedae. Yet, 
ambushes are laid and fellowmen are violated.   
[p. 90] The challenge to this humanist perspective of a social life made to man’s 
measure is of course its disruption by violence, fraud and war. There is no denying to the 
empirical reality of this, but the scholarly and political issue of course is: how do we 
understand such disruption? Is it a consequence of original sin, of the unavoidable limitations 
of the earthly city, or is it a demonstration as well as a reaction to a loss of consensus, that is, 
a disappearance of that basic understanding that allows the proper functioning of societies to 
some goal?  A first answer had been given in his Parallelon. 
The Tacitean style reinforces such an approach: the examples of failure are summarised 
in a flashy paradox, like when Grotius turns his derision of Greek ostracism into a hyperbole, 
by referring to the case of an ostracised politician who really was a crook, upon which his 
ostracisers felt unhappy and considered undoing their verdict, so much were they accustomed 
to expel innocent citizens. This stands in opposition to the ‘successful state’, the state in 
which civic probity and public wellbeing go hand in hand, recognizing the legitimate interests 
of citizens, whose  actions are described as sui iuris, or suo iure. The harmony of interests, the 
concordia, is what the state is about, contrary to the Athenian and Roman cases, where 
institutional deadlocks produced discordia and a dysfunctional opposition of interests. This 
concordia is a continuum therefore, from the agreement on the mutual advantages in exchange 
up to the recognition of the equivalent though unequal contributions of all members of 
society. 
Looking at Holland one should take the long run perspective of the transformation of 
trade and trades from the era of the Hansa to the trade revolution of late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in order to understand what Grotius is referring to. As Clé Lesger has 
shown,55 Dutch trade had developed in the shade of the dominant Hansa centre of Antwerp, 
                                                 
55 Clé Lesger, The rise of the Amsterdam market and information exchange : merchants, 
commercial expansion and change in the spatial economy of the Low Countries, c.1550-1630  
by specialisation in product-destination combinations, a capacity that supported the new role 
of Amsterdam after the 1685 fall of Antwerp. Amsterdam thus could become the co-
ordination node of a large network that relied as much on the traditional intra-European trade 
as on the new Indian one. Information networks and co-operation through specialisation are 
the catchwords of this [p. 91] new development, that i.a. helps to explain the complicated 
structure of the East-India Company (V.O.C.), with its five chambers and federal headquarters 
in Amsterdam.56 Grotius is very much aware of this link between trade and political 
organisation. In the Annales et Historiae, on which he started working while writing the 
Parallelon, he discusses the destructive policies of Robert Dudley earl of Leicester in the 
period 1585-87, upsetting the fine-grained interdependencies of the trade system by outlawing 
trade with Spain, Portugal, and then France. This trade ban forced many merchants to leave 
the Netherlands. The subsequent chasing away of Leicester in 1587 was only a matter of time, 
lest the whole war effort would collapse.57 Grotius claims in his Annales that the Dutch had 
been able to pay for the war, thanks to engaging even more cities in the government of 
Holland by giving these a seat in the province’s States.58 This ‘military-economic complex’ 
will be brought to further perfection by the co-operation between the States’ pensionary Johan 
van Oldenbarneveldt, responsible for the commercial strategy, and prince Maurice who 
professionalised siege warfare. Together they professionalised the smoothening of the ‘nerves 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); see also Oscar Gelderblom, Cities of commerce : the institutional 
foundations of international trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013); and now: Werner Scheltjens, Dutch Deltas. Emergence, Functions 
and Structure of the Low Countries’ Maritime Transport System, ca. 1300-1850 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2015). 
56 Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong and Joost Jonker, ‘The Formative Years of the Modern 
Corporation : The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602–1623’, The journal of economic 
history, 73 (2013), pp. 1050-1076. 
57 Hugonis Grotii Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis (Amsterdam: J. Blaeu, 1657),  book 
V of the Annales, pp. 10ff.; See for the interaction between financial, economic and political 
interests in that period: see especially the last chapter of James D. Tracy , The Founding of the 
Dutch Republic. War, Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572-1588 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
58 Book II, p. 40 of the Annals, on the enfranchisement  of 12 voting  cities in the States of 
Holland, in addition to the previous six. 
of war’, by integrating the financial capabilities of the merchants into the military strategy. 
The Dutch troops were paid on time, or the cities where they were encamped were 
indemnified directly, thereby preventing the politically and otherwise costly effects of the 
troops living of the countryside. Contrasting this in political propaganda with the predatory 
behaviour of Spanish troops, allowed the burgeoning republic to create the support needed to 
prevent defection to Spanish authority. The V.O.C. demonstrated a comparable military-
commercial mix. A corollary of these developments was the change in the financing of 
national debt towards a bond market.59 Even while all these [p. 92] things happened, and 
Grotius understood their importance, he evidently was not a neo-liberal, or even a liberal for 
that matter, but certainly a proto-liberal in his mature theory of civil society. In the early 
years, Grotius incited the Holland elite to be honourable, keep up concord and justice, 
especially in the face of the military challenge of the perfidious enemy. 
 ‘Concordia, for Cicero, always revolved around cooperation’.60 Concordia is the 
harmonious balancing of different interests, leading to peace and political stability. The 
promise of cooperation is success, as Sallust has it: ‘Concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia 
maximae dilabuntur’,61 and this motto had been acquired by the States General in 1580, to 
adorn its coat of arms, upon the abjuration of Philip II. The rich scale of meaning that 
concordia demonstrated, reflects this understanding of a well-ordered society, in the absence 
of civil strife. How is this harmony achieved? 
If we look at the Parallelon from this political perspective, it is clearly noticeable that 
Grotius does not want to allow any exception for his Batavian republic.  
 
                                                 
59  See Marjolein ’t Hart, The Dutch wars of independence : warfare and commerce in the 
Netherlands 1570-1680 (London: Routledge, 2014); Idem, The making of a bourgeois state : 
war, politics and finance during the Dutch revolt (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1993) and the comparative study by David Stasavage, States of Credit. Size, Power, and the 
Development of European Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
60 Jonathan Zarecki, Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice(London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014), p. 60. 
61  Sallustius, Jugurtha, 10. 
Populus Atheniensis, Populus Romanus, Populus Batavus, celebres omnes, quod 
probamus, & liberi. Nam alias non fieret comparatio τῶν συνονυμῶν, cum alia sit virtus 
servi, alia liberi.62  
 
His compatriots have as much right to a place under the sun as other peoples that are 
sovereign, i.e. sui iuris, or in other terms: a respublica perfecta, which are the defining 
characteristics of a civitas. Grotius considered the republic, already in 1602, to be an 
autonomous republic, at least in origin – ‘Batavia was a free republic, for that is the meaning 
of commonwealth [civitas]’,63 – one of the invariant elements of his civil philosophy. It is also 
on the authority of Tacitus, who – in line with Roman practice, considers as a rule the allied 
tribes of the Romans to be civitates. Grotius leaves aside this historical nicety, in his 
endeavour to deploy the vocabulary of autonomy, if not autarky.64 So the Dutch are a free 
commonwealth on an equal footing with the other two nations in the [p. 93] comparison. 
What is more, we see Grotius claim time and again, that the Batavians, i.e. Dutch exhibit in 
reality all these qualities that other peoples only can pretend to have: the Batavian Dutch are 
brave, prudent, trustworthy, just, and have a fair share of the intellectual virtues. They are also 
religious, in the simple, upright way of the early Christians, the Christians under the cross. 
Here as in De antiquitate Grotius exalts the consensus and concordia of the Hollanders, 
also by emphasizing the aristocratic character of the republic, in which the different parts of 
society each performed their role. By hindsight from De iure belli ac pacis, what is notably 
absent from the argument is any reference to appetitus societatis. If anything the driving force 
behind this blissful state of the Dutch is the fides perpetua. 
 
Fides is the foundation of justice 
 
Writing two years later, Grotius apparently puts fides to yet another use, when he claims in De 
iure praedae that there is a further regulatory principle, next to that of God willing the law of 
nature (regula 1) and that of the consensus omnium (regula 2). This third principle is regula 3: 
                                                 
62 Parallelon, I, p. 5 (Breviarium hujus liber tertii). 
63 Parallelon, Fol. 14v; I, p. 28 ‘Batavia [fuit] sui iuris respublica. Hoc enim sonat civitatis 
vocabulum’. 
64 De antiquitate I.2 (p. v): ‘Est igitur hoc iustissimum liberae reipublicae initium: quippe 
quam populus origine sua liber in libero solo constituit’. 
what each individual has indicated to be his will, that is law with respect to him. (p.18). 
Grotius calls this the regula fidei, the rule of faith, and says that he derived this rule from ‘the 
foregoing considerations’. This rather vague reference seems to refer to a cascade of 
arguments, rather than any of these in particular. We have to take a closer look. 
 
Starting from the second rule of the consensus omnium, the laws of inoffensiveness and 
of abstinence – two laws ‘relating to the good of others’ – are introduced, that together 
embody distinctions of ownership and of the Mine and Thine. “In this principle of confidence, 
so to speak, lies the origin of human society. That social impulse was the source of ta 
sumbolaia [agreements, contracts], that is to say, of reciprocal acts and sentiments, and of the 
intermingling of one’s own goods and ills with the goods and ill of others.”  Of the two forms 
of justice that of expletive justice is the most important here, because it concerns obligations, 
those of contract and those out of delictum, as expressed in the next two laws of nature: good 
deeds must be recompensed, and evil deeds must be corrected.  
Upon that chord, Grotius starts talking about natural liberty, nothing ‘other than the 
power [potestas] of each individual to act in accordance with his own will’. The Roman law 
term here is ‘sui iuris’, which is the legal state of being a free citizen and hence being eligible 
to own property. As Daniel Lee argued, this identification of libertas and potestas stemmed  
from Accursius, and Grotius [p. 94] accordingly will later introduce the potestas in se as 
description of liberty in IBP.65 Here in De iure praedae it is still an analogy: “liberty in regard 
to actions is equivalent to ownership in regard to property”, and the extension to persons 
(dominion over subjects, household, slaves) is absent. The subjective nature of property rights 
Grotius expresses in the saying (NB. from the Codex article on mandates Cod. IV.35.21) 
‘every man is the governor and arbiter of affairs relative to his own property’. 
The aim of the disquisition on liberty is to substantiate the claim that ‘the extent of 
credit involved [in the obligations] is measured by the will of the creditor ... since the 
exchange of good things is voluntary.’ That is an indication that the main concern here of 
Grotius is to find out how subjective rights (where each actor sets his own evaluation while 
managing his things) can be coherently put together in a society. In a successful exchange the 
creditor determines the value, the debtor accepts it. The point is that the subjective evaluation 
is crucial in the exchange, yet at the same time inaccessible for others. When expressed in an 
                                                 
65 Daniel Lee. ‘Popular Liberty, Princely Government, and the Roman Law in Hugo Grotius’s 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 72 (2011), pp. 371-392, at p. 377. 
agreement, however, the exchange value is “objectified”. If we for that reason abstract from 
the subjective value once the exchange has been achieved we would choose the so-called 
instrumentalism, a methodology connected with the name of the Chicago economist Milton 
Friedman, for whom subjective value is but a construct on the basis of exchange data. We 
would do as if persons have a valuation. How to stick to the basic principle of natural liberty 
that essentially involved subjective evaluation? Grotius’s answer is: by taking what an 
individual has expressed as his will to be a law unto him. Liberty is a normative concept that 
has as its main implication the demand of consistency on its owner. And Grotius calls this 
moral demand of consistency fides, trustworthiness. This interpretation coheres well with 
what we found in the Parallelon. This fides is not in the first place about the performance of 
contracts, but about the preconditions of contracts in a world populated with free human 
beings. To be free is to be one’s own master, what Grotius later will call ‘potestas in se’, 
power over one self.66 Thus Grotius can conclude: ‘fidem esse fundamentem iustitiae’, trust is 
the foundation of justice.67 
 
                                                 
66 Facultatem Iurisconsulti nomine Sui appellant: nos posthac ius proprie aut stricte dictum 
appellabimus: sub quo continentur Potestas, tum in se, quae libertas dicitur, tum in alios, ut 
patria, dominica: Dominium, plenum sive minus pleno, ut ususfructus, ius pignoris: et 
creditum cui ex adverso respondet debitum. IBP I.1.5. 
67 In previous publications I argued that while the substance of the natural law in De iure 
praedae and De iure belli ac pacis is largely the same, an important difference is in the 
pretended foundation of that natural law. In the former text, Grotius points to fides as the 
foundation of justice in the strict sense, whereas in the latter, written 20 years after, 
appetitus/custodia societatis is said to be the fountain of justice in the strict sense. At the same 
time, fides seems to be present in De iure belli ac pacis in a strictly delineated role, as the 
main mechanism to restore peace between belligerents that is as part of the jus post bellum. 
Here fides takes the form of the demonstration of a care for humanity and benevolent 
impartiality, magnanimity and fidelity. Cf. my ‘The Meaning of Trust: Fides between self-
interest and appetitus societatis’, in Pierre-Marie Dupuy – Vincent Chetail (eds.), The Roots of 
International Law / Les fondements du droit international: Liber Amicorum Peter 
Haggenmacher, Studies in the History of International Law 11/5 (Leiden - Boston: Brill, 
2013), pp. 39-58; ‘Grotius and Sociability’, History of European Ideas, 41 (2015), pp.  589–
604. 
[p. 95] Self-command and the standard interpretation 
 
This distinction between the obligatory character of the will and the obligatory character of 
agreements is supported by the chapter ‘De interpretatione’ in IBP. There Grotius starts out 
distinguishing between meaning and its expression. He does that in a characteristically 
Grotian way.68 
 
If we consider only the one who has promised, he is under obligation to perform, of his 
own free will, that to which he wished to bind himself. ‘In good faith [in fide] what you 
meant, not what you said, is to be considered,’ says Cicero. But because internal acts are 
not of themselves perceivable, and some degree of certainty must be established, lest 
there should fail to be any binding obligation, in case every one could free himself by 
inventing whatever meaning he might wish, natural reason demands that the one to 
whom the promise has been made should have the right to compel the promisor to do 
what the correct interpretation suggests. For otherwise the matter would have no 
outcome, a condition which in morals is held to be impossible.69 
 
[p. 96] Notice the qualification ‘in fide’, a term that Kelsey translated with ‘good faith’, and 
that John Morrice in 1738 believed to have rendered as follows: ‘When you promise, says 
Cicero, we must consider rather what you mean than what you say’. And Jean Barbeyrac, in 
his footnote to this quote, remarks that such a statement is nowhere to be found in Cicero, yet 
Grotius gives the reference, to Off. I.13 (§ 40), where the history of Regulus that we have 
seen in Parallelon, is presented. So Grotius is referring to his interpretation of the Regulus 
case as a case of exemplary fides. 
                                                 
68 Characteristic is that Grotius loves putting his readers on the wrong foot, by implying more 
than he says, as we will see from the reactions by Morrice and Barbeyrac to this passage. 
69  (IBP, II.16.1.1: Ipsum qui promisit solum si spectamus, sponte id praestare obligatur in 
quod obligari voluit. In fide quid senseris non quid dixeris cogitandum, inquit Cicero: Sed 
quia interni actus per se spectabiles non sunt, et certi aliquid statuendum est, ne nulla sit 
obligatio si quisque sensum quem vellet sibi affingendo liberare se posset, ipsa dictante 
naturali ratione ius est ei cuiquid promissum est promissorem cogere ad id quod recta 
interpretatio suggerit. nam alioqui res exitum non reperiret: quod in moralibus pro impossibili 
habetur. 
Barbeyrac and Morrice clearly want to miss the point: what obliges a person are the 
determinations of his will and Regulus does what he agreed to, even though by defending the 
interest of the Romans he forfeits his life.  
This is an extreme case, where everyone would have considered it understandable to 
change course, except that Regulus had a strong sense of self-imposed duty, and even revelled 
in his own consistency, one might add. The rule of fides is a normative ideal, not always 
reachable, maybe only to be found in extraordinary characters. But actually that is not the 
point. It is not about the enforceability of promises, but about the meaning for the actor of free 
choice: that one shouldn’t cheat oneself, by choosing something and then by being fickle, 
choose something else.  
So Grotius is also referring back to his arguments in his youthful writings. Moreover, he 
now confronts the determination of one’s will with the enforceable promise. Regulus’s 
promise to return to Carthago for all practical purposes was not enforceable. He did what he 
had set out to do, not considering the enforceability of his promise nor the possible harm he 
would have done to his promisee if he would have changed course.  
‘In fide’ determinations of the will (its content, or meaning) oblige, yet in practical life 
what counts is ‘the right [of the promisee] to compel the promisor to do what the correct 
interpretation [of the promise] suggests’. That is why the paragraph of ‘De interpretatione’ 
that we are dealing with is titled ‘quomodo promissa obligent exterius’, how promises are 
outwardly binding. They become outwardly binding by engaging in a shared understanding of 
promises, most famously described by the stipulatio of Roman law, on which Grotius’s 
brother Willem wrote one of his academic dissertations. In actual life of course differences 
easily arise, and the choice is between more details in the written contract, or a reference to 
‘common use’ or similar, or the introduction of arbitrage, or some combination thereof. The 
purpose is to find out what the parties intended to conclude when they concluded the 
contended contract. In the rest of the chapter ‘De interpretatione’, one finds provisions to 
promote such a standard interpretation, preventing surprises or idiosyncrasies, in other words 
with a view to promote intersubjective understanding. 
[p. 97] This brings us back to the starting point and the place of fides in Parallelon and 
De iure praedae. Fides is arguably a constant feature of Grotius’s understanding of what 
makes human cooperation fruitful and flourishing. Olli Lagerspetz recently argued that trust 
defies a general definition, and proposed that we should look rather for the conditions in 
which trust and distrust become topics for discussion. 
‘Trust’ should not be seen as a word with a stable reference but as an organizing tool for 
human relations, used in a reasoning context where we wish to justify or challenge 
behaviour.70  
 
In his writing career Grotius started out challenging the Roman-Spanish-Portuguese perfidy, 
and came in IBP to argue for the importance of trust promoting mechanisms in cases of 
distrust. These mechanisms are context-dependent. In war one abstains from killings and 
dispossessions even when formally justified. In contracts you should stick with the standard 
interpretation. 
In this chapter, we have presented Grotius’s concept of fides in context, demonstrating 
its importance, as well as its flexibility, standing between amicitia and cosmopolitism, 
operating on the border of personal self-determination and public duty, connecting private 
interest and social harmony, and representing the magnanimity required for transforming wars 
into peace. For all its elusiveness, trust is the quintessence of the larger social order that 
reaches beyond the small area of friendships and family ties. It brings out the stubbornness of 
those who want to be true to their self-determination in the public eye. It is significant that 
Grotius doesn’t use the concept of honour, or honnêteté. His moral world is not a market 
place, even while it seems formulated to support the market place of the modern world. To be 
happy in this world, Grotius’s women and men are well aware of the opportunities and 
challenges that the human free will brings along.  
 
Societies where people are (generally) trusting cannot be other than societies in which 
people are (generally) true to themselves in articulating and planning and living up to their 
social engagements. Interactions can always go wrong though, and the language of rights is 
there to mediate disagreements, because the basic character of a peaceful society is its 
concordia, a Rawlsian overlapping consensus. Such a concordia does not exclude a lot of 
disagreements on minor points, but the points are minor, since the language of rights, together 
with this elusive thing called ‘fides’ can handle the disagreements that might threaten to 
unsettle the peace. Thus, for Grotius, trust is something internal to [p. 98] the person, of which 
the external, the social relations that are upheld by the adagio ‘pacta sunt servanda’, are 
somehow a product. But the devil is in the details, and not all societies manage to be peaceful 
and trusting, and some are even outright perfidious. It is human nature to fight against such 
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perfidy, if necessary by waging war. And it will be honourable to answer perfidy with trust, 
even when in war. How else could peace be re-established?  
